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SUMMARY III 
Summary 
Argumentation can be a fruitful and helpful endeavor to gain knowledge, to develop 
deep understanding of complex matters, and to come to well-grounded conclusions, 
particularly, but not only when it comes to the field of science (e.g., Kuhn, 2005; Kuhn, 
2010; Quinn, Schweingruber, & Keller, 2012). For instance, scientific argumentation 
and evaluation are both core competences of biology education (Baxmann et al., 2009). 
The crucial nature of these competences is underscored by the fact that learners often 
encounter conflicting scientific positions, especially in the domain of ecology. These 
conflicting positions (e.g., global warming does vs. does not lead to forest dieback) 
originate from the great complexity and limited predictability of ecosystems. Thus, one 
of the goals of biology education is to qualify learners so that they sophisticatedly pro-
cess such conflicting positions to develop deep understanding and well-grounded con-
clusions, or put in another way: to qualify them for scientific argumentation. This not 
only applies to interpersonal discourse, but also to the intrapersonal process of argu-
mentative thinking, such as supporting theories with evidence or evaluating arguments 
(Kuhn, 2001). Therefore, learners that are confronted with conflicting scientific posi-
tions should engage in argumentative thinking and evaluate the strength of arguments 
and the quality of evidence on which the conflicting scientific positions are built.  
Argumentative thinking, however, is no spontaneous process; indeed, it has two 
central prerequisites. Learners require the “competence to apply” (Kuhn, 2001, p. 4) 
argumentative strategies such as supporting theories with evidence, rebutting counter-
arguments, or evaluating arguments. This “competence” is simply referred to as “skill” 
(cf. McCombs & Marzano, 1990). However, the skill of argumentative thinking is nec-
essary but not sufficient to engage in argumentative thinking. Learners also require the 
“disposition to apply” (Kuhn, 2001, p. 4) these strategies. This second prerequisite is 
shortly labeled “will” (cf. McCombs & Marzano, 1990) and has two crucial compo-
nents (Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Park, 2005): a) Evaluativist epistemological understanding 
forms the rational base for regarding argumentative thinking as being reasonable. b) 
Intellectual values reflect the extent to which people regard argumentation as being 
worthwhile. As the will to engage in argumentative thinking means regarding argumen-
tative thinking as a reasonable and worthwhile endeavor, it could be assumed to be a 
supportive base for the skill of argumentative thinking. 
IV SUMMARY 
In order to qualify learners for argumentative thinking, it seems crucial to foster 
both their required skill and will of argumentative thinking. For instance, Kuhn (2005) 
gave students the opportunity to improve both their skill and will of argumentative 
thinking in interactive sessions. In spite of its effectiveness, this indirect intervention 
took eight weeks, though. As time is a precious and scarce resource in schools, there is 
a need to develop and test appropriate short-term and more direct instructional ap-
proaches. The goal of this work was to meet this challenge by developing and testing 
short-term training interventions to foster skill and will of argumentative thinking. In 
recognition of biology education’s emphasis of argumentation and evaluation, these 
interventions should center the processing of conflicting scientific positions regarding 
sustainable development in the domain of ecology. 
Chapter 1 features the general theoretical background of this dissertation, which is 
based on the following cornerstones: the conceptual background of the skill and the 
will of argumentative thinking, biology education’s concern of scientific argumentation 
and evaluation, and the instructional background of short-term training interventions. 
Section 1.1 first introduces an argumentative model as a theoretical framework together 
with argumentative elements and their functions as the central skill-principles. Then, 
section 1.2 introduces the framework for the will of argumentative thinking, which is 
based on two components: evaluativist epistemological understanding and intellectual 
values. The characteristics and consequences of these two components form the central 
will-principles. Section 1.3 highlights the special importance of argumentative thinking 
for biology education and places special emphasis on the instructional concern for ap-
propriate measures to foster argumentative thinking. As the last cornerstone of the gen-
eral theoretical background, section 1.4 provides instructional considerations for train-
ing interventions to foster skill and will of argumentative thinking. It sets up the theo-
retical and empirical background for this dissertation’s three training interventions to be 
packages of the following components: learning goals and theoretical introduction that 
focus on the central skill- and will-principles, video examples that model these princi-
ples, self-explanation prompts that encourage learners to self-explain the videos’ under-
lying principles, and a self-regulated argumentation phase that affords argumentative 
thinking on a new topic. Against the general theoretical background, section 1.5 pro-
vides an overview of the dissertation’s three main theses, all of which refer to effective-
ly training skill and will of argumentative thinking. Specifically, Thesis 1 addressed the 
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claim that a short-term skill-training intervention fosters the skill of argumentative 
thinking when processing conflicting scientific positions in the domain of ecology. Fur-
thermore, Thesis 2 assumed that a short-term will-training intervention fosters the will 
to engage in argumentative thinking when processing conflicting scientific positions in 
the domain of ecology. Finally, Thesis 3 claimed that a short-term combined-training 
intervention on both skill and will fosters facets of both skill and will of argumentative 
thinking as well as argumentative thinking itself when processing conflicting scientific 
positions in the domain of ecology. Moreover, this dissertation intended to contribute to 
theoretical and practical considerations with reference to foster different facets of the 
skill and the will of argumentative thinking. 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the three experimental studies that were con-
ducted within the scope of this dissertation in order to investigate Theses 1 – 3. Section 
2.1 outlines the components of all three short-term training interventions that were test-
ed in the three studies. Specifically, three computer-based training interventions were 
developed that aimed at a learning time of about one hour: a skill-training intervention 
to foster the skill of argumentative thinking, a will-training intervention to foster the 
will to engage in argumentative thinking, and a combined-training intervention to fos-
ter both skill and will of argumentative thinking. All three training interventions con-
sisted of five components that were implemented against theoretical and empirical 
backgrounds: learning goals, theoretical introduction, video-examples, self-
explanations prompts, and a self-regulated argumentation phase. Furthermore, in 
recognition of the central importance of argumentative thinking for biology education, 
the domain of the training interventions was ecology. More precisely, the interventions 
focused on three topics of sustainable development. Next, section 2.2 describes the cen-
tral dependent variables in this dissertation. These include the two skill-facets: declara-
tive knowledge (i.e., declarative knowledge about the skill-principles) and procedural 
knowledge (about how to generate argumentative elements). This section also describes 
the three will-facets: epistemic orientation (indicating one’s orientation toward the 
evaluativist level of epistemological understanding), intellectual values (reflecting the 
extent on which one values intellectual engagement), and epistemic knowledge (i.e., 
declarative knowledge about will-principles). Further dependent variables were argu-
ment quality (as an indicator of argumentative thinking) and self-explanation quality 
referring to the skill- and will-principles. 
VI SUMMARY 
The training interventions were tested in three experimental studies. Participants in 
all three studies were German high school students in the final grade levels. Study 1 
(Manuscript A, summary in section 2.3) experimentally tested the skill-training inter-
vention (Hefter et al., 2014) with 84 participants (N = 84; 53 female, 31 male; 
Mage = 17.76; SDage = 0.93). The main results of Study 1 showed that the skill-training 
intervention fostered declarative knowledge (for at least one week) and procedural 
knowledge about argumentation, as well as argument quality. Furthermore, the inter-
vention fostered self-explanation quality referring to skill-principles, which mediated 
the effect on declarative knowledge about argumentation after one week. 
Study 2 (Manuscript B, summary in section 2.4) experimentally tested the will-
training intervention (Hefter et al., 2015a) with 66 participants (N = 66; 35 female, 
31 male; Mage = 18.21; SDage = 0.90). The main results showed that this intervention 
had positive effects on epistemic orientation (for at least one week), on intellectual  
values (after one week), and on epistemic knowledge (for at least one week). Further-
more, the intervention fostered self-explanation quality referring to will-principles, 
which mediated the effect on epistemic knowledge. The effect on intellectual values 
after one week was mediated by epistemic orientation. 
Finally, Study 3 (Manuscript C, summary in section 2.5) replicated most of the 
findings of Study 1 and 2. Study 3 also tested a combined-training intervention on both 
skill and will (Hefter et al., 2015b). It was an experiment conducted with 147 partici-
pants (N = 147; 80 female, 66 male, 1 unknown; Mage = 17.36; SDage = 0.89). The com-
bined-training intervention successfully fostered facets of skill and will of argumenta-
tive thinking (i.e., declarative knowledge about argumentation, intellectual values, and 
epistemic knowledge; all effects were stable after one week) as well as argument quali-
ty. The positive effect of the combined-training intervention on argument quality was 
mediated by self-explanation quality (referring to both skill- and will-principles). 
Ultimately, Chapter 3 discusses the results of the three studies within a bigger pic-
ture in order to draw cross-experimental conclusions. Specifically, the main results of 
this dissertation reveal (see section 3.1) that: (a) A short-term skill-training intervention 
fosters the skill of argumentative thinking when processing conflicting scientific posi-
tions in the domain of ecology (Thesis 1). This thesis was supported by findings of 
Study 1 and Study 3, emphasizing the effectiveness of the skill-training intervention to 
foster skill-facets. (b) A short-term will-training intervention fosters the will to engage 
SUMMARY VII 
in argumentative thinking when processing conflicting scientific positions in the do-
main of ecology (Thesis 2). Both the findings of Study 2 and Study 3 supported this 
thesis and underlined the effectiveness of the will-training intervention on will-facets. 
(c) A short-term combined-training intervention on skill and will fosters facets of both 
skill and will of argumentative thinking as well as argumentative thinking when pro-
cessing conflicting scientific positions in the domain of ecology (Thesis 3). This thesis 
was supported by Study 3. 
Furthermore, based on the results of Studies 1 – 3, section 3.2 provides the follow-
ing theoretical implications. First, self-explaining the video examples’ underlying cen-
tral skill- and will-principles turned out to be an important learning process during the 
training interventions because it mediated the enduring effects on knowledge about 
these principles. Furthermore, both the self-explanation quality referring to skill-
principles and the self-explanation quality referring to will-principles mediated the 
combined-training intervention’s effect on argument quality. Second, due to the will-
training and combined-training interventions’ effect on epistemic orientation and intel-
lectual values, these will-facets can be considered malleable by instructional approach-
es. Third, the will can be seen as a feasible base for the skill of argumentative thinking. 
From a more practical point of view, section 3.3 provides the following instructional 
implications: First, it is recommended to foster self-explanation quality through a com-
bination of learning goals, a theoretical introduction, and corresponding self-
explanation prompts (all three referring to the targeted central principles). Second, fos-
tering both the skill and the will of argumentative thinking—particularly the will before 
the skill—should help learners to achieve high argument quality. Third, for an enduring 
effect on procedural knowledge, the short-term skill-training intervention should be 
enhanced (e.g., by implementing more video examples and argumentation phases). 
Finally, section 3.4 discusses limitations of this research and provides guidelines for 
future research; these include the focus on the domain of ecology, testing the training 
interventions as whole packages, possible limitations of this dissertation’s frameworks 
for the skill and the will of argumentative thinking, and the interventions’ short-term 
character. Section 3.5 concludes this dissertation by pointing out the potential of short-
term training interventions for fostering skill and will of argumentative thinking, the 
importance of self-explanations of central principles during the interventions, and the 
advantage of addressing the will before the skill or argumentative thinking. 
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1 How to Foster Skill and Will of Argumentative Thinking? 
In this dissertation, argumentative thinking is considered an intrapersonal process of 
applying argumentative strategies such as evaluating arguments or rebutting counter-
arguments (Kuhn, 2001). The term intrapersonal refers to argumentative thinking that 
takes place in an individual’s mind and stands in contrast to interpersonal argumenta-
tion, which is a form of discussion with others. Argumentative thinking can, for in-
stance, help one come to a well-grounded conclusion when facing conflicting scientific 
positions (cf. Kuhn, 2005; Kuhn & Park, 2005). Apparently, applying argumentative 
strategies requires a skill such as knowing how to actually evaluate arguments or re-
butting counterarguments. For a detailed picture of this skill of argumentative thinking, 
see section 1.1, which introduces an argumentative model as a theoretical framework. 
Argumentative elements and their functions are described as the central skill-principles. 
Having the necessary skill, however, is not sufficient to perform argumentative think-
ing unless one considers it a reasonable and worthwhile endeavor. In this dissertation, 
seeing argumentative thinking as being reasonable and worthwhile is regarded as the 
will to engage in argumentative thinking. For more details on this, section 1.2 intro-
duces a framework and the central will-principles. The will to engage in argumentative 
thinking might be supportive in learning how to perform argumentative thinking. How-
ever, simply having the will to engage in argumentative thinking is not enough to per-
form it. In a nutshell, engaging in argumentative thinking requires both the skill and the 
will of argumentative thinking. Neither the skill alone, nor the will alone is sufficient to 
apply argumentative strategies. If, however, a learner has acquired both the skill and 
the will of argumentative thinking, engaging in argumentative thinking can be useful to 
gain knowledge, to develop deep understanding, and to come to a well-grounded con-
clusion when faced with conflicting scientific positions. These benefits are of special 
importance, for instance in biology education, particularly when it addresses the do-
main of ecology, as section 1.3 explains. Thus, it would be desirable to meet the chal-
lenge of developing and analyzing appropriate instructional methods to foster both cen-
tral prerequisites of argumentative thinking, namely skill and will. Against the theoreti-
cal and empirical background described in section 1.4, this dissertation focuses on ex-
ploring the potential of short-term training interventions to foster both skill and will of 
argumentative thinking. 
2 CHAPTER 1  
1.1 The Skill of Argumentative Thinking—Framework and Principles 
In this dissertation, a modification of Kuhn’s (1991, 2005) argumentation model 
serves as a framework for addressing the skill of argumentative thinking. This frame-
work describes the following six argumentative elements as well as their functions. 
The first element is the theory, which refers to an initial claim or statement. An   
example in the domain of ecology is that global warming leads to forest dieback. 
The given theory should be supported by arguments. One certain type of argument 
is genuine evidence, the second element of this framework. Genuine evidence, such as 
empirical findings, can help to clarify the theory’s truth. Therefore, genuine evidence 
implies a strong argument that supports the theory. For instance, data about the repro-
duction rates of tree-damaging parasites that benefit from an increasing temperature 
(Bentz et al., 2010) could serve as genuine evidence. Delivering such empirical find-
ings that an increase in temperature increases the population of parasites that damage 
trees is a strong argument for the theory that global warming leads to forest dieback. In 
contrast to genuine evidence, pseudoevidence only consists of explanations, further 
descriptions of the initial theory (Kuhn, 2001) or examples from one’s own life experi-
ence. Thus, pseudoevidence, such as personal impressions of damaged trees, does not 
contribute to the clarification of the truth of a theory such as that global warming leads 
to forest dieback. Hence, pseudoevidence does not imply a strong argument and thus is 
not seen as an argumentative element of this framework. 
The third element is the alternative theory, which is usually opposing the given 
theory. It can originate from either one’s own mind or external sources and is also sup-
ported by some evidence. Referring to the introductory example, the alternative theory 
that global warming does not lead to forest dieback opposes the theory that global 
warming does lead to forest dieback. 
The fourth element, the counterargument, affords shifting perspective and answers 
the question “What would someone who disagrees with my own position say?” A per-
son who disagrees with the theory that global warming leads to forest dieback could 
cite empirical findings on growth conditions of different tree species (e.g., Ellenberg, 
2009). These findings hint that an increase in the average temperature might have hard-
ly any effect on growth conditions of deciduous trees, as those trees would still prosper 
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in warmer regions. Considering these findings might lead somebody to think that global 
warming does not lead to forest dieback. 
The fifth element, the counterargument’s rebuttal, strengthens one’s own position. 
The aforementioned counterargument might indeed be built on genuine evidence, 
namely empirical findings. However, it could be rebutted by emphasizing that it is not 
relevant to the whole theory, but only aspects of it. Specifically, it only refers to growth 
conditions of deciduous trees, whereas it neglects the growth conditions of the wide-
spread conifers, which indeed are sensitive to an increase in temperature. Thus, this 
counterargument does not so much apply to global warming and forests, but rather cer-
tain parts of forests, namely deciduous trees. This evident lack of relevance to the theo-
ry could be a possible target for the rebuttal. 
Finally, the sixth element, the synthesis, refers to a careful evaluation of the 
strength of all given arguments and counterarguments in order to come to a well-
grounded conclusion. Kuhn’s (1991) original model would suggest a refutation of the 
alternative theory for the final element. This dissertation’s framework rather uses a syn-
thesis so as to place a stronger focus on evaluating arguments. This might also provide 
a fertile ground for evaluativist epistemological understanding, which in short means 
regarding evaluations as reasonable (see full description in section 1.2). The synthesis 
should evaluate whether all given arguments and counterarguments are built on genuine 
evidence rather than pseudoevidence and whether the given evidence is relevant to the 
whole theory rather than to single aspects or prerequisites thereof. As a result, the syn-
thesis might still be viewed as a refutation of the alternative theory. However, it might 
also state that one position—perhaps under certain conditions—could be more right 
than the other or that further evidence or research is required. With respect to the sim-
plified example about global warming and forest dieback, a synthesis that has con-
sidered the given arguments and counterarguments might conclude that different tree 
species react differently to an increase in temperature. Even though this might hardly 
affect deciduous trees, a careful evaluation reveals that there is reason to assume that 
conifers would die back. Moreover, further evidence that refers to additional factors 
and aspects such as time or parasite populations should also be addressed. 
In fine, the skill of argumentative thinking can shortly be described as the “compe-
tence to apply” (Kuhn, 2001) argumentative strategies such as evaluating arguments, 
supporting theories with evidence, or rebutting counterarguments. Furthermore, the 
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central principles of the skill of argumentative thinking (simply labeled skill-principles) 
can be derived from the six previously described elements of the argumentation model 
and their functions. An example for such a skill-principle is that genuine evidence—
such as empirical findings—supports the given theory by contributing to the clarifica-
tion of its truth. 
1.2 The Will of Argumentative Thinking—Framework and Principles 
As previously mentioned, the skill of applying argumentative strategies by itself is 
not sufficient for actually engaging in argumentative thinking. The “disposition to ap-
ply” (Kuhn, 2001) these strategies by considering argumentative thinking to be both 
reasonable and worthwhile is also required. This prerequisite received the short label 
will (cf. McCombs & Marzano, 1990). As outlined by Kuhn and Park (2005), the will 
to engage in argumentative thinking builds on two components: evaluativist epistemo-
logical understanding and intellectual values. 
The first component, evaluativist epistemological understanding, refers to personal 
epistemology (Barzilai & Zohar, 2014). Personal epistemology describes an indi-
vidual’s thinking about the nature of knowledge and knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997) 
and can be studied and conceived against the background of different and even partly 
contradicting scientific approaches. Examples for these approaches include the resource 
approach (e.g., Louca, Elby, Hammer, & Kagey, 2004) or dimensional models (e.g., 
Ferguson & Braten, 2013; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). This dissertation is built on the de-
velopmental approach of Kuhn and colleagues (Kuhn, 2005; Kuhn, Cheney, & 
Weinstock, 2000; Kuhn & Park, 2005) and uses it as the theoretical background and 
framework for addressing the will to engage in argumentative thinking. 
According to Kuhn and Park (2005), there are three levels of epistemological un-
derstanding for individuals between school age and adulthood. These are the absolutist 
level, the multiplist level, and the evaluativist level, which is the highest of the three. At 
the first level—the absolutist level—of epistemological understanding, positions such 
as that global warming leads to forest dieback are seen in black or white terms (i.e., as 
being either correct or incorrect facts). Thus, argumentative thinking is deemed un-
necessary. At the second level—the multiplist level—of epistemological understanding, 
positions are seen as freely chosen opinions. Without believing in the “dis-
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criminability” (Kuhn & Park, 2005, p. 113) of conflicting positions such as whether 
global warming leads to forest dieback, argumentative thinking is considered irrelevant. 
It is not until individuals have reached the third level—the evaluativist level—of     
epistemological understanding, that they see some positions as being more justified 
than others based on the evaluation of arguments and evidence. Thus, the evaluativist 
level of epistemological understanding provides the rational base on which one can 
come to regard argumentative thinking as a reasonable tool to develop deep under-
standing and well-grounded conclusions (Kuhn & Park, 2005). The importance of 
reaching this level for engaging in argumentative thinking is supported for example by 
studies of Mason and Boscolo (2004) and Mason and Scirica (2006). In both studies, 
the authors used controversial topics in the domain of ecology. Mason and Boscolo 
(2004) confronted students with conflicting positions about the topic of genetically 
modified food. They found that epistemological understanding facilitated the students’ 
argumentative processes such as reasoning and evaluating conflicting positions. Fur-
thermore, Mason and Scirica (2006) introduced students to the topics of global warm-
ing and genetically modified food. The authors found that the students with evaluativist 
epistemological understanding produced higher quality arguments. In sum, evaluativist 
epistemological understanding means regarding argumentative thinking as a reasonable 
endeavor and can be considered a central component of the will to engage in argumen-
tative thinking. 
However, considering argumentative thinking to be reasonable may not be enough 
to engage in such intellectual engagement unless it is also regarded as being in-
trinsically worthwhile. Hence, Kuhn and colleagues (Kuhn, 2009; Kuhn & Park, 2005) 
propose a further component in addition to evaluativist epistemological understanding: 
intellectual values. These represent the value one places on intellectual engagement 
such as argumentative thinking. The evaluativist level of epistemological understanding 
already regards argumentative thinking as reasonable and thus implies the possibility of 
developing deep understanding and well-grounded conclusions through argumentative 
thinking. In contrast, intellectual values go even one step further and actually imply the 
desirability of developing deep understanding and well-grounded conclusions through 
argumentative thinking. Hence, intellectual values are considered to be based on an 
evaluativist level of epistemological understanding (Kuhn & Park, 2005). This is be-
cause on the lower levels of epistemological understanding (i.e., absolutist and multi-
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plist level) argumentative thinking is not seen as a reasonable, but as an unnecessary or 
irrelevant endeavor. Thus, the absolutist and multiplist level lack the rational base for 
intellectual values, whereas the evaluativist level provides this base. 
In short, individuals who have acquired the will to engage in argumentative think-
ing have reached the evaluativist level of epistemological understanding and developed 
intellectual values. Thus, they consider argumentative thinking to be a reasonable and 
worthwhile tool to gain deep understanding and well-grounded conclusions. In other 
words, the will of argumentative thinking allots argumentative thinking certain utili-
tarian benefits or advantages, namely being a tool to gain deep understanding and well-
grounded conclusions. From a more motivational perspective, this could be considered 
as providing argumentative thinking with utility value (e.g., Eccles & Wigfield, 2002). 
Hence, when learners realize that argumentative thinking has utility value, they might 
be more motivated to acquire the skill of argumentative thinking. This consideration 
might become adjuvant when developing instructional measures, because it adumbrates 
a possible reason for first fostering the will to engage in argumentative thinking (i.e., 
establishing utility value) before fostering the skill of argumentative thinking. Further-
more, it should be considered that—according to Kuhn and colleagues (Kuhn, 2009; 
Kuhn & Park, 2005)—evaluativist epistemological understanding and intellectual val-
ues develop (if at all) over many years between childhood and adulthood. Therefore, 
the will to engage in argumentative thinking could be seen as more dispositional and 
less malleable, thus scaling up the instructional challenge of fostering it. Hence, in  
order to meet this challenge, developing effective interventions such as well-designed 
training interventions becomes desirable. 
Finally, against the background of this framework, the characteristics and con-
sequences of each level of epistemological understanding and of intellectual values 
form the central principles of the will to engage in argumentative thinking (simply la-
beled will-principles). An example of such a will-principle is that the evaluativist level 
of epistemological understanding means not seeing conflicting scientific positions as 
correct/incorrect facts or freely chosen opinions, but as evaluable positions built on 
arguments. Thus, an individual on the evaluativist level of epistemological under-
standing considers argumentative thinking as a reasonable tool to develop deep under-
standing and well-grounded conclusions about conflicting scientific positions, both of 
which play a major role in, for example, biology education. 
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1.3 Argumentative Thinking in Biology Education 
Engaging in argumentative thinking—given both skill and will to do so are          
assured—can help to gain knowledge and to develop deep understanding of a topic as 
well as well-grounded conclusions (e.g., Kuhn, 2005; Quinn et al., 2012). Biology edu-
cation is a good example of where this is of special importance—in particular in the 
domain of ecology. The reason for this special importance lies in the nature of biology 
(no pun intended). Biology can be regarded as the science about living systems (Harms, 
Mayer, Hammann, Bayrhuber, & Ulrich, 2004). Living creatures (including trees) are 
enormously complex living systems of molecules, cells, and organs (Reece et al., 
2011). To make matters even more complex (and at the same time even more fascinat-
ing), living systems such as certain trees are part of greater systems such as popula-
tions, communities, and whole ecosystems (Townsend, Begon, & Harper, 2008). These 
ecosystems are very complex  because of their high number of factors, interactions and 
dependency on (initial) conditions (Rieß & Mischo, 2008). For example, a typical   
European forest can be regarded as an ecosystem that features various interacting popu-
lations of flora and fauna that are dependent on climatic conditions (among many other 
factors). Due to this high level of complexity, ecosystems often exhibit stochastic be-
havior (Schurz, 2006), which lowers the degree of predictability of their processes. An 
example for such processes is a temperature increase due to global warming and its 
possible consequences on the ecosystem forest. Does, for instance, global warming lead 
to forest dieback? There is no trivial answer to this question. It is not sufficient to de-
scribe the relation between temperature and tree population by using a simple linear 
relation model with only two factors (one factor such as temperature increases while 
another factor such as tree population decreases). There are many factors and condi-
tions (e.g., tree species, location, humidity) that influence the relationship between 
temperature and tree population (e.g., Ellenberg, 2009). Furthermore, there are many 
interactions with other populations such as the population of tree-damaging parasites 
(e.g., Bentz et al., 2010). Moreover, these parasites’ reproduction cycles are also influ-
enced by many factors; for instance, tree parasites populations tend to be augmented by 
increasing temperatures. In short, ecosystems’ complexity can be immense. 
Qualifying students to deal and work with such complex ecosystems is a major 
concern of biology education. Two goals of biology education in particular makes this 
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concern apparent: One goal is to foster systems thinking (Baxmann et al., 2009). This 
refers, inter alia, to the following processes: considering the interdependence between a 
system’s elements, considering time dynamics, developing an appropriate model of a 
system, and making prognoses (Ossimitz, 2000; Riess & Mischo, 2010). Recent didac-
tical research is concerned with developing and analyzing appropriate approaches to 
foster systems thinking. For instance, Riess and Mischo (2010) analyzed teaching 
methods to foster systems thinking of sixth-grade students. They found that a com-
bination of special lessons and a computer-simulated scenario on the topic “ecosystem 
forest” promoted conceptual understanding of systems thinking. 
In spite of these results, understanding systems thinking is not enough for pro-
cessing ecosystems’ complexity. Thus, biology education has another important goal 
that this dissertation seizes in particular: the goal to qualify students to actively partici-
pate in social communication, discussion, and decision-making about ecosystems 
(Baxmann et al., 2009). This goal recently gained even more importance, as the United 
Nations declared the years 2005 till 2014 the “Decade of Education for Sustainable 
Development” (Wals, 2012). Education for sustainable development is part of the inter-
disciplinary goals of biology education (Harms et al., 2004). Sustainable development 
refers to discussions and solutions about (but not limited to) interactions between hu-
manity and ecosystems. Issues in the field of sustainable development include the con-
sequences of genetic engineering or of resettling disappeared species such as the lynx. 
The “Decade of Education for Sustainable Development” (Wals, 2012) emphasized the 
importance of qualifying students to initiate, create and discuss processes of sustainable 
development. In short, they are required to participate in discussions about sustainable 
development (Künzli & Bertschy, 2008). This is however easier said than done: As 
previously stated, due to their complexity and limited predictability, ecosystems cannot 
be fully analyzed. This might lead to fragile knowledge or even conflicting scientific 
positions. These can in particular be found when it comes to topics of sustainable de-
velopment. Revisiting the previous example about global warming and forest dieback, 
there is the position that global warming leads to forest dieback. In order to support this 
position, one could refer to data about temperature-sensitive reproduction of tree-
damaging parasites (e.g., Bentz et al., 2010). These data indicate rather negative con-
sequences of global warming on the forests because an increase in the average tempera-
ture would lead to an increase in the reproduction of parasites that in turn causes in-
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creasing damage to trees. On the other hand, one could also support the position that 
global warming does not lead to forest dieback. Thereto, empirical findings could be 
cited that show the growth conditions of different tree species (e.g., Ellenberg, 2009). 
These findings hint that a rise in temperature might hardly affect the growth conditions 
of deciduous trees because they still prosper when it is warmer. Apparently, both ex-
emplary positions can be backed up with evidence. 
Given such conflicting positions that refer to a complex ecosystem, how might stu-
dents follow the previous recommendations and participate in social communication, 
discussion and decision-making (Baxmann et al., 2009)? Prior to that, how might they 
develop a deep understanding of the topic and arrive at a well-grounded conclusion? 
Scientific argumentation and evaluation might help. In short, students should be quali-
fied to support claims with scientific evidence and to evaluate different scientific posi-
tions such as whether a systems’ complexity has been sufficiently considered and/or 
whether these positions are based on empirical evidence rather than personal impres-
sions or mere descriptions. In sum, in addition to fostering systems thinking (which is 
not in the focus of this dissertation), biology education has to foster its learners’ scien-
tific argumentation and evaluation. Indeed, scientific argumentation and evaluation are 
both core competences of biology education, particularly in higher grades (Baxmann et 
al., 2009; Harms et al., 2004). 
Against this background, developing appropriate instructional methods to foster ar-
gumentative thinking has the potential to contribute to biology education’s goal to fos-
ter scientific argumentation and evaluation. This dissertation provides such a con-
tribution by developing and analyzing short-term training interventions on skill and will 
of argumentative thinking while processing conflicting scientific positions in the do-
main of ecology. 
1.4 Training Interventions to Foster Skill and Will of Argumentative 
Thinking 
Argumentative thinking is of major importance—especially in biology education 
with respect to the domain of ecology—because it can help learners when processing 
conflicting scientific positions: Argumentative thinking can serve as a tool to gain deep 
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understanding and well-grounded conclusions (Kuhn & Park, 2005). Thus, developing 
and analyzing appropriate instructional methods to foster both central prerequisites of 
argumentative thinking, namely skill and will, is an instructional challenge. 
Most of the few existing instructional approaches to foster skill and will of argu-
mentative thinking follow principles of indirect instruction (e.g., Valanides & Angeli, 
2005). For instance, Kuhn (2005) used practice methods and had students engage in 
interactive sessions to foster their argumentative processes. The students had certain 
goals to reach, for instance to learn that “some reasons are better than others” (Kuhn, 
2005, p. 153) or “opposing reasons can be countered” (Kuhn, 2005, p. 153). In order to 
achieve this, the students cycled through different activities and, depending on the ac-
tivity, were required to work individually, in pairs, and in groups with coaching to pre-
pare for the “showdown” (Kuhn, 2005, p. 158). In this showdown, student teams repre-
sented conflicting views and discussed their arguments. Additionally, adults who inter-
acted with the students were supposed to serve indirectly as “role models” along the 
way and to thereby contribute to the students’ valuation of intellectual engagement. In 
short, Kuhn’s (2005) intervention offered students the opportunity to improve both the 
skill and the will of argumentative thinking. This could be considered an indirect inter-
vention because little instructional guidance was given, examples or problem solutions 
were hardly presented, and central principles of argumentation were not made explicit 
either. Although Kuhn’s (2005) intervention has shown promising results in terms of 
fostering students’ argumentation processes, it is a rather time consuming process, for it 
required 16 sessions of 90 minutes over a span of eight weeks. As time is a precious 
and scarce resource in schools, there is a clear need for developing more direct and 
short-term, yet effective instructional methods to foster skill and will of argumentative 
thinking. 
This dissertation is an attempt to address this by contemplating short-term training 
interventions on both skill and will of argumentative thinking. Generally, training inter-
ventions are defined as structured and temporary interventions aimed at developing or 
increasing various types of knowledge and competences (Fries & Souvignier, 2009). 
They are frequently used as effective means in instructional settings to achieve various 
learning goals, for instance fostering reading comprehension (Gersten, Fuchs, 
Williams, & Baker, 2001), generic fostering of self-explanations (Busch, Renkl, & 
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Schworm, 2008), fostering self-explanation and reading strategies (McNamara, 2004), 
or fostering focused processing of explanations (Berthold & Renkl, 2010). 
How to build training interventions that are short-term, yet effective? A reasonable 
approach on which to build appropriate training interventions is example-based learn-
ing, which is considered to be a prototype form of direct instruction (Kirschner, 
Sweller, & Clark, 2006; Lee & Anderson, 2013). Instructional approaches based on 
example-based learning have the potential to be both time-efficient (e.g., Kirschner et 
al., 2006) and effective for learning various procedures (e.g., Renkl, 2011). This effec-
tiveness can be explained against the background of the cognitive load theory (e.g., 
Sweller, 2005), which recognizes the limited capacity of the learners’ working 
memory. Confronting learners with an unfamiliar problem—especially learners with 
little or no prior knowledge about this problem—bears the risk of cognitive overload 
(Sweller, Van Merrienboer, & Paas, 1998). For instance, giving learners the task to 
process conflicting scientific positions and develop well-grounded conclusions might 
overstrain them, because they have not yet acquired argumentative strategies such as 
evaluating arguments. Thus, without an appropriate solutions strategy (in this case ar-
gumentative strategies to process the conflicting positions), learners would get cogni-
tively absorbed in their search for a solution. In the end, learners might be unable to 
deeply understand the principles that are relevant to the solution process (Renkl, 2014). 
They are highly unlikely to find a satisfactory solution and might even acquire miscon-
ceptions or incomplete knowledge instead (Kirschner et al., 2006). In contrast, provid-
ing examples that model the core problem-solving principles would allow learners to 
devote their cognitive resources to understanding the necessary solution process 
(Renkl, 2014). For instance, the intervention by Schworm and Renkl (2007), which 
effectively fostered argumentation skills, consisted of video examples that showed two 
people discussing the topics of stem cell research and gender differences in learning. 
Note that, unlike worked examples for algorithmic domains such as mathematics, these 
video examples on argumentation skills showed no discrete algorithmic solution 
(Schworm & Renkl, 2007). Rather, they exemplified a problem solution for processing 
conflicting positions by modeling argumentative strategies, which followed Kuhn’s 
(1991) argumentation model. Hence, learners had to actually process “two content lev-
els” (Schworm & Renkl, 2007, p. 286). One level represented the argumentative strate-
gies, which were in the main focus of learning. The other level was the concrete the-
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matic exemplifications of these strategies in the given topics of the dialogues. Exempli-
fying argumentative strategies to solve the problem of given conflicting positions 
should help learners devote their attention to these argumentative strategies. Ideally, 
learners would then deeply understand these argumentative strategies and acquire the 
knowledge necessary to apply them to other situations. 
Realistically however, providing examples is seldom sufficient without ensuring 
that learners deeply process them as well. This is due to the fact that learners often just 
cursorily go over the given examples. Although they acknowledge the information, 
they do not automatically develop a deep understanding of the examples’ underlying 
principles (e.g., Renkl, 1997, 2011). As a corrective for this, self-explanation in gener-
ally considered to be a learning strategy that can be applied in various domains and 
contexts and has the potential to effectively help learners to deeply process and benefit 
from examples (Roy & Chi, 2005). Self-explaining the principles that underlie the ex-
amples is a crucial process on the way to a deep understanding of these principles (e.g., 
Renkl, 1997). In other words, learners should explain the principles that are the ra-
tionale of the examples’ solution to themselves (Renkl, 2014). For learners to engage in 
such principle-based self-explaining, example-based learning has to be facilitated by 
self-explanation prompts or a previous training for self-explanation (Renkl, 2011). For 
instance, an example-based approach for fostering argumentation tested by Lao and 
Kuhn (2002) had not considered these important aspects to foster self-explanation and 
thus showed to be hardly effective. In contrast, self-explanation prompts were a central 
element of the effective example-based intervention on argumentation skills by 
Schworm and Renkl (2007). Their self-explanation prompts were questions that guided 
the learners’ attention toward the examples’ central principles as they should recognize 
and justify argumentative elements and their function. Thereby, these prompts fostered 
the learners’ self-explanation of the central argumentative principles. Indeed, the im-
plementation of these self-explanation prompts was essential for the intervention’s ef-
fect on argumentation skills, as an experimental condition without these prompts 
proved to be relatively ineffective. Recent research provides even more evidence for 
the benefits of complementing examples with self-explanation prompts (e.g., Berthold, 
Eysink, & Renkl, 2009; Berthold & Renkl, 2009; Crippen & Earl, 2007; Hilbert, Renkl, 
Kessler, & Reiss, 2008; Wong, Lawson, & Keeves, 2002). Against this background, the 
following approach appears to be a reasonable core for an effective training inter-
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vention on skill and will of argumentative thinking: combining video examples that 
model central principles of skill and will of argumentative thinking with self-
explanation prompts that ask learners to self-explain these underlying principles. 
However, there are more aspects to consider while developing effective training in-
terventions that focus on example-based learning. First, a presentation of learning goals 
is also important. Making the corresponding learning goals explicit to the learners 
might support them in self-explaining the examples’ underlying principles (Renkl, 
2011). Furthermore, reviews of effective strategy instruction (Friedrich & Mandl, 1997; 
Harris, Alexander, & Graham, 2008) also hint at the importance of presenting learning 
goals. For example, Harris et al. (2008) suggested a metacognitively rich strategy in-
struction for maintaining and transferring learned strategies. Presenting learning goals 
could be considered to be a type of such an instruction (Berthold & Renkl, 2010).   
Second, the initial phase of example-based learning is crucial because it is here that 
learners “acquire basic declarative knowledge about a domain” (Renkl, 2014, p. 15). 
Thus, one should consider integrating a theoretical introduction on the targeted princi-
ples in example-based training interventions. This introduction should provide infor-
mation about the upcoming video examples’ underlying principles, which learners are 
supposed to self-explain. Recent research supports this consideration, as there are a few 
studies on effective training interventions that also presented their learning goals as 
well as theoretical introductions. For instance, the effective training interventions by 
Berthold and Renkl (2010), which fostered focused processing of explanations, in-
structed learners to read about the intervention’s learning goals before providing them a 
theoretical introduction on the upcoming content. The successful generic self-
explanation training intervention by Busch et al. (2008) also featured a presentation of 
the intervention’s learning goals and provided general introductory theoretical infor-
mation about self-explanations. Against this background, it seems reasonable that—
before presenting video examples and self-explanation prompts—an effective training 
intervention on skill and will of argumentative thinking should show leaners the respec-
tive learning goals. This should be followed by a theoretical introduction that provides 
some initial explanatory input about the central principles of skill and will of argumen-
tative thinking. 
Finally, interventions should also encourage learners to practice the acquired strate-
gies (van Hout-Wolters, Simons, & Volet, 2000). Similarly, Harris et al. (2008) suggest 
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that strategies instruction “demands self-regulated use of the academic strategies that 
have been developed” (p. 92). In other words, there should be a transition from the pre-
vious act of self-explaining video examples to independently solving a problem. This is 
also recommended by Renkl and Atkinson (2003); they argue that the cognitive de-
mands of applying principles to solve a problem should have ideally decreased due to 
the knowledge acquired by previously self-explaining the former examples. With re-
spect to argumentative thinking, when leaners then actively practice argumentative 
strategies without any support, they cannot just follow an available example. Rather, 
they should solve a given problem that is they have to process conflicting scientific 
positions and develop their own position. To solve this problem meaningfully, learners 
should have already acquired a basis (Renkl, 2014) through the previous studying and 
self-explaining of central principles underlying the video examples. Then, a self-
regulated argumentation phase should build on this basis and afford learners the oppor-
tunity to finally apply, practice, and thus further consolidate argumentative strategies. 
All in all, the previous theoretical and empirical considerations view effective train-
ing interventions on skill and will of argumentative thinking as packages that are com-
prised of a total five components that are learning goals, a theoretical introduction,  
video examples, self-explanation prompts, and a self-regulated argumentation phase. 
To explore the potential of such newly developed training interventions, it would be 
sensible to test them in experimental studies. 
1.5 Research Theses 
As previously discussed, there is a need to overcome the instructional challenge of 
developing short-term, yet effective, interventions to foster skill and will of argumenta-
tive thinking. Emphasizing this challenge in particular, argumentative thinking is of 
major importance in biology education when addressing the domain of ecology. For 
short-term, yet effective methods, it seemed feasible to rely on training interventions 
that focus on example-based learning. In order to foster skill and will of argumentative 
thinking, training interventions should address the central principles of skill and will of 
argumentative thinking, which are explained in the sections 1.1 and 1.2: the argumenta-
tive elements and their function (i.e., the skill-principles) and the characteristics and 
consequences of each level of epistemological understanding and of intellectual values 
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(i.e., the will-principles). As justified in section 1.4, these training interventions should 
be packages that are comprised of the following components: a presentation of learning 
goals and a theoretical introduction that refer to the targeted principles, video examples 
that model these principles, self-explanation prompts to encourage learners to self-
explain these principles, and finally a self-regulated argumentation phase that affords 
applying argumentative strategies without any support. Given this background, the fol-
lowing questions arise for empirical testing: Does such a training intervention that fo-
cuses on skill-principles foster facets of the skill of argumentative thinking? Similarly, 
when a training intervention’s components focus on will-principles, does it foster facets 
of the will to engage in argumentative thinking? Does a training intervention that fo-
cuses on both the skill- and the will-principles foster skill- and will-facets of argumen-
tative thinking? Finally, and reflecting the fact that argumentative thinking requires 
both the skill and the will to do so, does such a training intervention foster argumenta-
tive thinking as well? These questions reflect the overall research goal that this disserta-
tion addressed with three experimental studies: To explore the potential of short-term 
training interventions on fostering skill- and will-facets as well as argumentative think-
ing when processing conflicting scientific positions in the domain of ecology. At the 
same time, the three studies were intended to further contribute to these theoretical con-
siderations: Does self-explaining the video examples’ principles play such a crucial role 
during the training interventions, as suggested in section 1.4? Is the will to engage in 
argumentative thinking really more dispositional and thus less malleable as previously 
mentioned in section 1.2, or can potentially high effective instructional measures still 
enhance will-facets? Might the will to engage in argumentative thinking be a feasible 
base for the skill to perform it, as suggested in section 1.2? From a more practical point 
of view, the ultimate goal of this dissertation was to provide instructional implications 
to guide the design of short-term training interventions to foster skill and will of argu-
mentative thinking. 
To address these issues, three computer-based training interventions were devel-
oped: a skill-training intervention to foster the skill of argumentative thinking, a will-
training intervention to foster the will to engage in argumentative thinking, and a com-
bined-training intervention to foster both the skill and the will of argumentative think-
ing. Skill and will of argumentative thinking were conceived against the respective 
frameworks described in sections 1.1 and 1.2. Each of the three training interventions 
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was developed against the instructional background of training interventions discussed 
in section 1.4 and thus featured the following components: learning goals, theoretical 
introduction, video examples, self-explanations prompts, and a self-regulated argumen-
tation phase. Furthermore, to reflect the major importance of argumentative thinking in 
biology education when addressing the domain of ecology, each of the training inter-
vention featured the domain of ecology and referred to topics of sustainable develop-
ment. As mentioned before, scientific argumentation and evaluation are core compe-
tencies of the curriculum of biology education, especially in the final grade levels of 
German high schools (Harms et al., 2004). Thus, the participants for the training inter-
ventions were German high school students in the final grade levels. One particular 
benefit for those soon-to-be high school graduates is that fostering skill and will of ar-
gumentative thinking could also contribute to their growing role as responsible citizens 
after leaving school (Kuhn, 2005). 
The three training interventions were tested in three experimental studies presented 
in three Manuscripts A – C. The goal of Study 1 (see Manuscript A) was to test the 
skill-training intervention, whereas the goal of Study 2 (see Manuscript B) was to test 
the will-training intervention. Finally, in Study 3 (see Manuscript C) the goals were to 
replicate findings of the previous studies and to test the combined-training training in-
tervention. Overall, the following three theses (Theses 1 – 3) are in the focus of this 
dissertation, and they address the potential of short-term training interventions to foster 
skill and will of argumentative thinking. 
• Thesis 1: A short-term skill-training intervention fosters the skill of argu-
mentative thinking when processing conflicting scientific positions in the 
domain of ecology. 
• Thesis 2: A short-term will-training intervention fosters the will to engage in 
argumentative thinking when processing conflicting scientific positions in 
the domain of ecology. 
• Thesis 3: A short-term combined-training intervention on skill and will fos-
ters facets of both skill and will of argumentative thinking as well as argu-
mentative thinking when processing conflicting scientific positions in the 
domain of ecology. 
Study 1 investigated Thesis 1 and Study 2 investigated Thesis 2. Finally, Study 3 
once again tested Thesis 1 and Thesis 2, and it investigated Thesis 3. 
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2 Experimental Studies in this Dissertation 
This dissertation covers three experimental studies that explored the potential of 
short-term training interventions on fostering skill and will of argumentative thinking. 
Manuscripts A – C reported on each of the three studies in detail. Study 1 (Hefter et al., 
2014) tested effects of a skill-training intervention on the skill of argumentative think-
ing. Study 2 (Hefter et al., 2015a) tested effects of a will-training intervention on the 
will to engage in argumentative thinking. Finally, Study 3 (Hefter et al., 2015b) repli-
cated findings of Study 1 and 2 and furthermore tested a combined-training interven-
tion on both skill and will of argumentative thinking. 
2.1 Overview of the Training Interventions 
Three different training interventions were developed and tested within the scope of 
the three studies in this dissertation: a skill-training intervention to foster the skill of 
argumentative thinking, a will-training intervention to foster the will to engage in ar-
gumentative thinking, and a combined-training intervention to foster both skill and will 
of argumentative thinking. The domain of all three training interventions was ecology 
(referring to topics of sustainable development), thereby reflecting the importance of 
argumentative thinking for biology education (see section 1.3). Each intervention (de-
scribed in detail in the respective manuscripts) took the form of a computer-based 
learning environment that aimed at a learning time of about one hour. Furthermore, 
each of the three training interventions was developed against the previously discussed 
instructional background about training interventions (see section 1.4). Thus, all the 
interventions featured the components that section 1.4 justified earlier: learning goals, 
theoretical introduction, video examples, self-explanation prompts, and self-regulated 
argumentation phase. Table 1 presents an overview of the training intervention’s com-
ponents and their targeted principles. 
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Table 1. The Training Interventions’ Components and Their Targeted Principles 
Component 
Skill-
training 
Will-
training 
Combined-training 
No- 
training Skill-will-
version 
Will-skill-
version 
Learning goals and 
theoretical introduction I 
Skill Will Skill Will E-learning 
Video example I Skill Will Skill Will Skill/Will 
Self-explanation prompts Skill Will Skill Will Ecology 
Learning goals and 
theoretical introduction II 
— — Will Skill — 
Video example II Skill Will Will Skill Will/Skill 
Self-explanation prompts Skill Will Will Skill Ecology 
Self-regulated  
argumentation phase 
Identical for all conditions 
 
 
Specifically, the learning goals and the theoretical introduction of the skill-training 
intervention referred to the skill-principles (i.e., argumentative elements and their func-
tions; see section 1.1). Likewise, the learning goals and the theoretical introduction of 
the will-training intervention referred to the will-principles (i.e., characteristics and 
consequences of each level of epistemological understanding and intellectual values; 
see section 1.2). The combined-training intervention featured both of these presenta-
tions of learning goals and theoretical introductions about the skill-principles and about 
the will-principles. 
Furthermore, each training intervention featured two video examples that showed 
genuine conflicting positions in the domain of ecology. The first video example re-
ferred to the topic of biodiversity. Biodiversity, at its simplest, means species richness 
and refers to the number of different species in a given area, such as a certain forest 
(Townsend et al., 2008). The video example on this topic featured the conflicting scien-
tific positions, whether resettling the lynx in local forests does or does not lead to nega-
tive ecological consequences. The second video example referred to the topic of global 
warming and featured the conflicting scientific positions, whether global warming does 
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or does not lead to forest dieback. In the skill-training intervention, both video exam-
ples showed two people who modeled the skill-principles. During each of the video 
examples, four self-explanation prompts encouraged the participants to self-explain the 
underlying skill-principles (i.e., argumentative elements and their functions). Similarly, 
in the will-training intervention both video examples modeled the will-principles. They 
were also supplemented with four self-explanation prompts that encouraged the partici-
pants to self-explain the video’s will-principles (i.e., characteristics and consequences 
of each level of epistemological understanding and intellectual values). While develop-
ing the combined-training intervention, the priorities were to keep the learning time still 
short (not much longer than one hour). Moreover, overstraining the participants should 
be avoided. Thus, the number of video examples remained two, and the focus of the 
video examples and the respective self-explanation prompts was either on the skill- or 
the will-principles at one time. Hence, the combined-training intervention consisted of 
only one video example on each the skill and the will of argumentative thinking, unlike 
the skill-training and will-training intervention that used two video examples. Further-
more, actually two versions of the combined-training intervention were developed: The 
skill-will-version featured the components that addressed the skill-principles (i.e., 
learning goals, theoretical introduction, and video example with prompts) before the 
components that addressed the will-principles (i.e., learning goals, theoretical intro-
duction, and video example with prompts). The will-skill-version was composed vice 
versa (see Table 1). This allowed for testing the assumption that fostering the skill of 
argumentative thinking should benefit from first providing argumentative thinking with 
utility value by fostering the will of argumentative thinking (see section 1.2). 
Each training intervention also featured a self-regulated argumentation phase about 
the topic of genetic engineering. This phase afforded the participants the opportunity to 
generate their own position on whether the cultivation of genetically modified plants 
leads or does not lead to negative ecological consequences. A short video, which did 
not include any modeling or discussion, provided the necessary content information for 
the participants to generate their own position without any support. 
Furthermore, a no-training intervention was developed as a learning environment 
for the control groups of each of the three studies. This no-training intervention did 
indeed feature the identical video examples on skill and will, respectively (as outlined 
in Table 1, Column 6) as well as a self-regulated argumentation phase identical to the 
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training interventions. However, learning goals and theoretical introduction were about 
e-learning and the self-explanation prompts referred to the exemplifying content of the 
videos (i.e., ecology). Thus, the no-training intervention did not address any skill- or 
will-principles. 
2.2 Overview of the Dependent Variables 
Manuscripts A – C describe the dependent variables of all three studies in detail. 
Nevertheless, Table 2 provides the reader with a neat overview of these variables, all of 
which are briefly discussed in the remainder of this section. It also plays a supportive 
role in cross-experimental discussion, which is presented later in Chapter 3. 
 
Table 2. Central Dependent Variables in the Three Studies 
Type Label Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Skill-facets Declarative knowledge X — X 
 
Procedural knowledge X1 — X 
Will-facets Epistemic orientation — X X 
 Intellectual values — X X 
 Epistemic knowledge — X2 X 
Argumentative thinking Argument quality X — X 
Self-explanation quality of skill-principles X — X 
Self-explanation quality of will-principles — X X 
Note. X: assessed, —: not assessed. 
1Procedural knowledge was labeled generative knowledge in Manuscript A. 
2Epistemic knowledge was labeled conceptual knowledge in Manuscript B. 
 
2.2.1 Facets of the skill of argumentative thinking—declarative and procedural 
knowledge 
The two facets of the skill of argumentative thinking (simply labeled skill-facets) 
refer to the framework and principles introduced in section 1.1. They were central de-
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pendent variables in Study 1 and Study 3, which tested the skill-training intervention 
and the combined-training intervention. Effects of the will-training intervention on 
skill-facets were not tested because of the lack of a reasoned hypothesis to assume such 
effects; no analyses were conducted unless they were explicitly based on proper hy-
potheses (as recommended for example by Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985). Moreover, 
Study 2 did not address skill-facets because it solely focused on testing effects of the 
will-training intervention on the will to engage in argumentative thinking. 
Within the scope of this dissertation, the first skill-facet is declarative knowledge. 
Declarative knowledge is defined as knowledge that can be reported or described 
(Anderson, 1993). It can relate to rather single facts but also to more complex 
knowledge about concepts and principles (Renkl, 2009). In this dissertation, declarative 
knowledge represents reportable knowledge about the skill-principles that form the six 
previously described elements of the argumentation model and their functions (see sec-
tion 1.1). 
The second skill-facet within the scope of this dissertation is procedural knowledge 
about how to perform argumentative thinking. Procedural knowledge is defined as 
knowledge that is manifested in people’s performance and “must be compiled from 
declarative knowledge through practice” (Anderson, 1993, p. 22). It should be noted 
that in this dissertation the self-regulated argumentation phase is considered to be a 
type of practice opportunity (see section 1.4). Moreover, the label procedural 
knowledge is not used in Manuscript A because its study (i.e., Study 1) actually as-
sessed two different kinds of procedural knowledge. They referred to different aspects 
of the argumentation model and were labeled evaluative knowledge and generative 
knowledge. Evaluative knowledge focuses on how to evaluate arguments. It refers to 
knowing how to choose the stronger of two given arguments by evaluating and differ-
entiating between genuine evidence and pseudoevidence. Generative knowledge fo-
cuses on knowing about how to generate all six elements of the argumentation model. 
Unlike Study 1, Study 3 only assessed generative knowledge as procedural knowledge 
because of the high number of variables assessed in Study 3. When having to decide 
between assessing either evaluative or generative knowledge, generative knowledge 
seems to be more appropriate to represent procedural knowledge. This is due to the fact 
that generative knowledge entails generating all six argumentative elements, whereas 
evaluative knowledge involves just one argumentative element (i.e., genuine evidence). 
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Thus, this dissertation focuses on generative knowledge as a representation of proce-
dural knowledge. Consequently, the label procedural knowledge refers to generative 
knowledge throughout the whole dissertation. 
2.2.2 Facets of the will of argumentative thinking—epistemic orientation, 
intellectual values, and epistemic knowledge 
The facets of the will of argumentative thinking (simply labelled will-facets) refer 
to the framework and principles outlined in section 1.2. Will-Facets were central de-
pendent variables in Study 2 and Study 3 to analyze effects of the will-training inter-
vention and the combined-training intervention. Note that effects of the skill-training 
intervention on will-facets were not tested because there were no reasoned hypotheses 
to assume such effects. Furthermore, will-facets were not addressed in Study 1 because 
it only focused on the skill-facets. 
The first will-facet is epistemic orientation and is based on the framework of     
epistemological understanding as outlined in section 1.2. Epistemic orientation repre-
sents a tendency to move away from rather absolutist beliefs toward more evaluativist 
beliefs. Absolutist beliefs are beliefs an individual on the absolutist level of epistemo-
logical understanding—according to Kuhn and Park (2005)—would hold, such as that 
scientific statements are either clearly true or false. In contrast, evaluativist beliefs are 
beliefs an individual on the evaluativist level of epistemological understanding would 
hold. An example would be that even uncertain knowledge (e.g., when scientific posi-
tions contradict each other) can be evaluated. In short, epistemic orientation indicates 
the extent to which one considers argumentative thinking to be reasonable. 
Besides epistemic orientation, the second will-facet is intellectual values; these 
serve as a measure for the extent to which an individual values intellectual engagement 
such as argumentative thinking. Finally, the last will-facet within the scope of this dis-
sertation is epistemic knowledge. This dissertation uses the name epistemic knowledge 
as a distinctive (and unmistakable) label for declarative knowledge about will-
principles, because the label “declarative knowledge” already refers to the skill-facet 
that is declarative knowledge about skill-principles. As section 1.2 explains, will-
principles are characteristics and consequences of each level of epistemological under-
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standing and of intellectual values. Note that due to the review processes for the manu-
scripts, epistemic knowledge is labeled conceptual knowledge in Manuscript B. 
2.2.3 Argumentative thinking—argument quality 
Each of the three training interventions featured a self-regulated argumentation 
phase that afforded the participants an opportunity to process two conflicting scientific 
positions without any support. The participants’ task was to generate their own posi-
tion. The participants’ positions were rated for argument quality against the background 
of the previously described modified argumentation model (see section 1.1). For in-
stance, high argument quality refers to when participants have generated their own po-
sition using all components of the argumentation model: theory, genuine evidence, al-
ternative theory, counterargument, rebuttal, and synthesis. This process of independent-
ly developing one’s own position entailed applying argumentative strategies such as 
supporting a theory, evaluating evidence, and developing a well-grounded conclusion. 
In other words, the act of generating one’s own position actually meant engaging in 
argumentative thinking. The participants could not rely on extraneous input or help 
because no such was given. Furthermore, they could not rely on simply reciting the 
previous video examples from memory, because the self-regulated argumentation phase 
referred to a new topic. Hence, the generation of their own position could be considered 
a kind of output of argumentative thinking, suggesting that argument quality might 
serve as an indicator of argumentative thinking. 
Argument quality was assessed as a dependent variable in Study 1 and Study 3 to 
analyze effects of the skill-training intervention (Study 1 and Study 3) and the com-
bined-training intervention (Study 3). Note that this dissertation’s rationale is that a 
decent level of argument quality—as an indicator of argumentative thinking—requires 
both skill and will of argumentative thinking. The three studies in this dissertation con-
tribute to this rationale step by step, first focusing exclusively on fostering the skill 
(Study 1), then exclusively on fostering the will (Study 2), and finally on fostering both 
the skill and the will (Study 3) of argumentative thinking. Therefore, argument quality 
was not framed as requiring both skill and will of argumentative thinking until Manu-
script C (about Study 3) and this synopsis. More precisely, in Manuscript A about 
Study 1, argument quality was simply framed as a component of argumentation skills. 
This was due to the fact, that Study 1 did not address the will to engage in argumenta-
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tive thinking, but focused exclusively on the skill of argumentative thinking. Further-
more, argument quality was not assessed in Study 2. Rather, Study 2 used a simplifica-
tion of the variable argument quality: Application of evaluativist knowledge. This was 
not a detailed rating for argument quality, but a dichotomous check to see, whether the 
participants had considered that there was more than one position, and that one of these 
could be better or more right than the other. This could be regarded as a precursor of 
argumentative thinking. The reason for this modification in Study 2 was the fact that 
the argumentation model (on which the rating of argument quality was based) was not 
addressed in the will-training intervention. The will-training intervention did not focus 
on training the skill to use strategies such as comprehensively evaluating arguments or 
rebutting counterarguments. 
2.2.4 Self-explanation quality that refers to the central skill- and will-principles 
In each training intervention, the participants were prompted eight times to type in 
self-explanations referring to the video examples. In the control condition, these 
prompts focused on the ecological content, whereas the prompts in the training condi-
tions focused on the respective principles that were modeled in the video examples (see 
also Table 1 in section 2.1). As a measure for learning processes, the quality of the par-
ticipants’ self-explanations was rated. This rating referred to the quality, how the par-
ticipants self-explained the principles that were trained in the respective training inter-
vention. Thus, when testing the skill-training intervention in Study 1, self-explanation 
quality referred to the skill-principles (see section 1.1). Likewise, when testing the will-
training intervention in Study 2, self-explanation quality referred to the will-principles 
(see section 1.2). Finally, testing the skill-training, the will-training, and the combined-
training intervention on skill and will in Study 3 necessitated assessing two kinds of 
self-explanation quality: one referring to the skill-principles and another one to the 
will-principles. 
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2.3 Summary of Study 1: Developing and Testing a Skill-Training 
Intervention 
The goal of Study 1 was to develop and test a short-term computer-based training in-
tervention on the skill of argumentative thinking. This skill-training intervention was 
tested against a no-training intervention (i.e., control group design) in an experimental 
study with 84 German high school students (N = 84; 53 female, 31 male; Mage = 17.76; 
SDage = 0.93). 
In short, the results of Study 1 showed that the skill-training intervention success-
fully fostered the skill-facets that are declarative and procedural knowledge about ar-
gumentation. Furthermore, the skill-training intervention had a positive effect on argu-
ment quality. The positive effect on declarative knowledge was stable one week after 
the training. However, in contrast to the stable effect on declarative knowledge, the 
training intervention’s effect on procedural knowledge had vanished when it was tested 
again one week after the training. This finding implies that the short-term skill-training 
intervention’s effect on procedural knowledge was not strong enough to be preserved 
over a longer period of time. The skill-training intervention also fostered self-
explanation quality that referred to the skill-principles. This self-explanation quality, in 
turn, mediated the training intervention’s effect on declarative knowledge one week 
after the training. 
In sum, the results of Study 1 show that the skill-training intervention is an effective 
instructional measure when starting to foster the skill of argumentative thinking. How-
ever, the skill-training intervention did not focus on the will to engage in argumentative 
thinking; this was addressed in Study 2. 
2.4 Summary of Study 2: Developing and Testing a Will-Training 
Intervention 
The goal of Study 2 was to develop and test a short-term computer-based training 
intervention on the will to engage in argumentative thinking. This will-training inter-
vention was tested against a no-training intervention (i.e., control group design) in an 
experimental study with 66 German high school students (N = 66; 35 female, 31 male; 
Mage = 18.21; SDage = 0.90). 
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In short, the findings of Study 2 showed that the will-training intervention success-
fully fostered epistemic orientation, the application of evaluativist knowledge, and     
epistemic knowledge. Furthermore, one week after the training intervention, there were 
still positive effects on epistemic orientation and on epistemic knowledge as well as a 
positive effect on intellectual values. The will-training intervention also fostered self-
explanation quality that referred to the will-principles. This self-explanation quality, in 
turn, mediated the training intervention’s effect on epistemic knowledge both immedi-
ately and one week after the training. These effects indicate the crucial role of self-
explanations for learning processes during the training intervention. Moreover, the ef-
fect on intellectual values after one week was mediated by epistemic orientation. 
Overall, the will-training intervention can be regarded as an effective instructional 
method when starting to enhance the will to engage in argumentative thinking. Howev-
er, the will-training intervention did not address the skill of argumentative thinking. 
Hence, Study 2 did not assess skill-facets or argument quality. Thus, the will-training 
intervention might be insufficient instructional help for learners to actually perform 
strategies such as evaluating arguments or rebutting counterarguments when learners 
do not have such strategies in their skill repertoire. Finally, Study 3 addressed both the 
skill and the will of argumentative thinking. 
2.5 Summary of Study 3: Replicating Findings of Study 1 and 2 and 
Developing and Testing a Combined-Training Intervention 
In Study 3, two goals were addressed. The first goal was to replicate the findings on 
the effectiveness of the previous skill-training intervention (Study 1) and of the previ-
ous will-training intervention (Study 2). Conducting replication studies is recently par-
ticularly emphasized (e.g., Yong, 2012) and doing so would strengthen the findings of 
the first two studies. Thus, the original skill-training intervention (Study 1) and the 
original will-training intervention (Study 2) were tested against a control condition (i.e., 
no-training intervention). The second goal was to develop and to test a short-term train-
ing intervention on both the skill and the will of argumentative thinking. This com-
bined-training intervention was developed while building on the materials of the previ-
ous skill-training intervention (Study 1) and the previous will-training intervention 
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(Study 2). As described in section 2.1, it contained components of both previous inter-
ventions. 
Study 3 was an experimental study with 147 German high school students 
(N = 147; 80 female, 66 male, 1 unknown; Mage = 17.36; SDage = 0.89). Five conditions 
were compared: (a) skill-training intervention, (b) will-training intervention, (c) com-
bined-training intervention, (d) combined-training intervention with reversed sequence 
of skill- and will-components, and (e) no-training intervention (control condition). In 
short, the results of Study 3 showed a replication of previous findings on the effective-
ness of both the skill-training and the will-training interventions. Again, the skill-
training intervention fostered declarative knowledge for at least one week as well as 
procedural knowledge. Furthermore, the will-training intervention fostered two will-
facets, namely intellectual values and epistemic knowledge, for at least one week. 
However, there was no effect on epistemic orientation. A closer look (see Manuscript 
C) indicates unexpectedly high values of epistemic orientation of the control group as a 
possible reason for this lack of effect on epistemic orientation. It might have been a 
coincidence or a consequence of the only moderate reliability of the scale for epistemic 
orientation (Cronbach’s αPosttest (Study 3) = .62). 
Moreover, the combined-training intervention fostered skill- as well as will-facets. 
This is remarkable because, unlike the skill-training and the will-training interventions, 
the combined-training intervention consisted of only one video example on each the 
skill and the will of argumentative thinking. Despite this, it fostered declarative 
knowledge, intellectual values, and epistemic knowledge. These positive effects were 
stable for at least one week. However, the combined-training intervention did not foster 
procedural knowledge. This finding was no surprise because even the skill-training 
intervention, which featured two video examples on skill, reached its limits with re-
spect to fostering procedural knowledge, as its effect on procedural knowledge van-
ished after one week. Moreover, the combined-training intervention achieved no effect 
on epistemic orientation. The sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 further act on this matter when 
they address the respective theses.  
Study 3 also showed positive effects on argument quality. Not only did both the 
skill-training and the will-training intervention foster argument quality, but—as ex-
pected—the combined-training intervention as well. Furthermore, Study 3 provided 
further insight into fostering argument quality, which served as an indicator for argu-
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mentative thinking. First, the will-skill-version of the combined-training intervention, 
which addressed the will-principles before the skill-principles, was superior at fostering 
argument quality when compared to the other training interventions. Second, both types 
of self-explanation quality (i.e., referring to both the skill- and will-principles) medi-
ated the combined-training intervention’s effect on argument quality. 
In sum, Study 3 replicated findings on the effectiveness of the skill-training inter-
vention (Study 1) and of the will-training intervention (Study 2). Furthermore, the re-
sults of Study 3 show that the combined-training intervention (the will-skill-version in 
particular) is an effective and promising short-term method to foster both the skill and 
the will of argumentative thinking and argumentative thinking itself. 
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3 General Discussion 
As this dissertation’s central contributions, section 3.1 supports its three main the-
ses, which address the potential of short-term training interventions to effectively foster 
skill and will of argumentative thinking. Section 3.2 deals with the theoretical implica-
tions of this dissertation’s findings, which shed light on self-explaining central princi-
ples as a crucial learning process, the malleability of will-facets, and the will as a    
feasible base for the skill of argumentative thinking. Furthermore, section 3.3 presents 
practical instructional implications for designing training interventions to achieve high-
er self-explanation quality, higher argument quality, and enduring effects on procedural 
knowledge about argumentation. Following a critical discussion of the limitations of 
this research as well as lines for future research, a conclusion wraps up this dissertation. 
3.1 The Potential of Short-Term Training Interventions 
This dissertation’s overarching goal was to experimentally investigate the potential 
of short-term training interventions to foster two central prerequisites of argumentative 
thinking: skill and will. As this dissertation’s central contributions, this section dis-
cusses the main results below by examining the following three theses (see section 1.5). 
3.1.1 Thesis 1: A short-term skill-training intervention fosters the skill of 
argumentative thinking when processing conflicting scientific positions in the 
domain of ecology. 
To examine this thesis, the present dissertation features two experimental studies. 
First, Study 1 tested the effects of a short-term skill-training intervention (see section 
2.1). The results of Study 1, which are summarized in section 2.3, showed that this 
skill-training intervention successfully fostered not only self-explanation quality of 
skill-principles and argument quality, but also declarative knowledge and procedural 
knowledge. The positive effect on declarative knowledge was found to be stable one 
week after the training. In addition to this enduring positive effect, another important 
aspect emphasizes the skill-training intervention’s effectiveness: The control group 
received the exact same video examples as well as an identical self-regulated argumen-
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tation phase as the training group. Thus, the control group could be considered rather 
“strong”, underlining the training intervention’s effects. All these results provide sup-
port for Thesis 1. 
Moreover, one of the goals in Study 3 was to replicate the findings of Study 1. As 
previously summarized in section 2.5, the results of Study 3 did indeed replicate find-
ings of Study 1: Once again, the skill-training intervention fostered declarative 
knowledge (for at least one week), procedural knowledge, and argument quality. 
In summary, these findings of both Study 1 and Study 3 provide cross-experimental 
and thus strong support for Thesis 1: The two skill-facets (i.e., declarative and proce-
dural knowledge about argumentation) can effectively be fostered through a short-term 
skill-training intervention. However, in both Study 1 and Study 3 the skill-training in-
tervention reached its limits with respect to fostering procedural knowledge as the ef-
fect on procedural knowledge had vanished after one week. This finding implies that 
the intervention’s effect was not strong enough to be preserved over an extended period 
of time. From a theoretical perspective on different knowledge types, there is a plausi-
ble explanation for these limited effects on procedural knowledge: As mentioned     
earlier, when introducing the skill-facets in section 2.2.1, declarative knowledge can be 
seen as reportable knowledge about facts, concepts, and principles (Anderson, 1993; 
Renkl, 2009). In contrast, procedural knowledge rather manifests itself in people’s per-
formance and has to be compiled from declarative knowledge (Anderson, 1993). In line 
with the ACT-R theory (Anderson, 1983, 1993), it could further be argued that proce-
dural knowledge about generating arguments is built on available declarative 
knowledge about the structure of these arguments. In other words, it might be easier 
and faster for learners to construct declarative knowledge rather than procedural 
knowledge about argumentation. Thus, the skill-training intervention appears a rather 
insufficient measure for constructing enduring procedural knowledge. This raises the 
question, how the training intervention might be modified to ensure enduring effects on 
procedural knowledge. Suggestions for modifications might include increasing the 
number of video examples and providing more than one self-regulated argumentation 
phase; section 3.3.3 provides a more detailed explanation. 
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3.1.2 Thesis 2: A short-term will-training intervention fosters the will to engage in 
argumentative thinking when processing conflicting scientific positions in the 
domain of ecology. 
Two experimental studies examined Thesis 2: First, Study 2 tested the effects of a 
short-term will-training intervention (see section 2.1). The results of Study 2, which are 
summarized in section 2.4, showed that the will-training intervention successfully fos-
tered epistemic orientation, intellectual values (after one week), and epistemic 
knowledge. Furthermore, the positive effects on epistemic orientation and on epistemic 
knowledge could still be observed after one week. Just as it was the case in Study 1 
when testing the skill-training intervention, the control group received the exact same 
video examples as well as an identical self-regulated argumentation phase as the train-
ing group. Bearing this “strong” control group in mind, the positive findings further 
emphasize the effectiveness of the will-training intervention, especially because they 
could still be found after one week. Thus, Thesis 2 is supported. 
Additionally, in order to provide more support for Thesis 2, one goal of Study 3 
was to replicate findings of Study 2. As previously summarized in section 2.5, the re-
sults of Study 3 did indeed replicate some important findings of Study 2. In Study 3, 
the will-training intervention fostered intellectual values and epistemic knowledge. 
Both effects could still be found one week after the experiment. However, there was no 
effect on epistemic orientation. A closer look (see discussion in Manuscript C) indi-
cates that this might be caused by the control group’s unexpectedly high measures of 
epistemic orientation in Study 3, which were higher than the control group’s measures 
of epistemic orientation in Study 2. This might be due to the only moderate reliability 
of the epistemic orientation scale (see section 2.5). Nevertheless, both the findings of 
Study 2 and Study 3 together provide cross-experimental and thus strong support for 
Thesis 2. 
Moreover, as previously mentioned in section 1.2, Kuhn and colleagues (Kuhn, 
2009; Kuhn & Park, 2005) argue that evaluativist epistemological understanding and 
intellectual values develop over many years between childhood and adulthood. How-
ever, the support of Thesis 2 (specifically: the will-training intervention’s positive ef-
fect on the will to engage in argumentative thinking), puts this consideration in a differ-
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ent light because it shows the possibility of actually training will-facets. The derived 
theoretical implications are discussed in section 3.2.2. 
3.1.3 Thesis 3: A short-term combined-training intervention on skill and will fosters 
facets of both skill and will of argumentative thinking as well as 
argumentative thinking when processing conflicting scientific positions in the 
domain of ecology. 
To examine this thesis, Study 3 tested the effects of a short-term combined-training 
intervention on skill and will of argumentative thinking that was based on the previous 
skill-training and will-training interventions. The results of Study 3, which are summa-
rized in section 2.5, showed that the combined-training intervention fostered not only 
declarative knowledge (a skill-facet), but also intellectual values (a will-facet), and  
epistemic knowledge (also a will-facet) as well. These effects could still be found one 
week after the experiment. Furthermore, the combined-training intervention fostered 
argument quality. As mentioned previously, argument quality served as an indicator for 
argumentative thinking. Thus, all these findings provide support for Thesis 3: The 
combined-training intervention did indeed foster facets of both skill and will of argu-
mentative thinking as well as argumentative thinking. Even against the background of 
the previously shown effectiveness of the skill-training and the will-training inter-
ventions, these results are not trivial. This is due to the fact that the combined-training 
intervention was not just a consecutive combination of the skill-training and the will-
training interventions. Rather, it consisted of only one video example on each the skill 
and the will of argumentative thinking, unlike the skill-training and will-training inter-
vention that used two video examples (see section 2.1). Even so, the combined-training 
intervention provided an additional benefit to the participants compared to the previous 
skill-training or will-training intervention: It fostered facets of both the skill and the 
will of argumentative thinking as well as argumentative thinking (i.e., argument quali-
ty) itself. 
However, not all of the results were positive for the combined-training intervention, 
for it did not foster all the previously introduced skill-facets and will-facets, as there 
was no effect on procedural knowledge and no effect on epistemic orientation. The lack 
of effect on procedural knowledge seems to be in line with a general limitation of short-
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term training interventions, as the skill-training intervention was only capable of show-
ing an immediate but not enduring effect on procedural knowledge (see section 3.1.1). 
Thus, section 3.3.3 discusses practical implications for fostering procedural knowledge. 
The lack of effect on epistemic orientation, however, seems to be due to the control 
group’s unexpectedly high measures of epistemic orientation, which was already men-
tioned in section 3.1.2 when addressing Thesis 2. All in all, in supporting Thesis 3, the 
findings underline the potential of short-term training interventions on fostering skill 
and will of argumentative thinking. 
3.2 Theoretical Implications 
From a theoretical perspective, the three studies of this dissertation pursued the 
overarching goal to shed light on theoretical assumptions on which the training inter-
ventions were developed: the importance of self-explaining the central skill- and will-
principles as a crucial learning process during the interventions, the malleability of 
will-facets, and finally the will as a feasible base for the skill of argumentative think-
ing. Overall, the results of all three studies together suggest the following theoretical 
implications. 
3.2.1 Self-explaining central principles as an important learning process during the 
training interventions 
First, self-explanation quality that referred to the skill-principles mediated the skill-
training intervention’s effect on declarative knowledge one week after the training 
(Study 1). Hence, the extent to which the participants successfully self-explained the 
skill-principles underlying the video examples (i.e., the argumentative elements and 
their functions) influenced the knowledge about argumentative elements and their func-
tions one week later. Second, in Study 2, self-explanation quality that referred to the 
will-principles mediated the will-training intervention’s effect on epistemic knowledge 
both immediately and one week after the training. In other words, the extent to which 
the participants successfully self-explained the will-principles underlying the video 
examples (i.e., the characteristics and consequences of each level of epistemological 
understanding and of intellectual values) influenced their knowledge about these prin-
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ciples—not only immediately but also one week after the training intervention. In a 
nutshell, this mediation effect pattern in both Study 1 and Study 2 emphasizes the im-
portance of self-explanations for intervention effects that go beyond immediate perfor-
mances. Apparently, the self-explaining of central principles facilitates enduring 
knowledge about these principles that can be retrieved one week later. This could be 
considered an important contribution to the literature because previous research (e.g., 
Berthold et al., 2009; Berthold & Renkl, 2009) has mostly focused on the mediating 
influence of self-explaining on immediate performances. 
Moreover, the findings of Study 3 place even more emphasis on the importance of 
self-explanations during the training intervention. Both the self-explanation quality of 
skill-principles and the self-explanation quality of will-principles mediated the com-
bined-training intervention’s effect on argument quality. Thus, self-explaining both the 
skill- and will-principles influenced the participants’ actual performance of argumenta-
tive thinking. This could also be considered an important contribution the literature, 
because it does not show the mediating influence of self-explaining on knowledge like 
previous research does (e.g., Berthold et al., 2009; Berthold & Renkl, 2009), but on 
actually performing argumentative thinking. Again, the participants had performed ar-
gumentative thinking while generating their own position on conflicting scientific posi-
tions about a new topic without any support. Besides the knowledge or skill to do that, 
it also required the will to engage in argumentative thinking. 
In summary, self-explanations played a crucial role during the training interven-
tions. Self-explanation quality that referred to central principles mediated important 
effects of the training interventions that go beyond immediate performances and also 
beyond effects on knowledge. Section 3.3.1 revisits the importance of self-explaining 
from a more practical point of view. 
3.2.2 Will-facets as malleable by instructional approaches 
Both the findings of Study 2 and Study 3 contribute the following aspects that 
might emphasize the malleability of will-facets. First, the training interventions on the 
will to engage in argumentative thinking used in this dissertation showed positive ef-
fects on will-facets. To be more precise, the will-training intervention fostered          
epistemic orientation, intellectual values, and epistemic knowledge in Study 2. In Study 
3, the will-training intervention and the combined-training intervention fostered intel-
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lectual values and epistemic knowledge. These results reveal that will-facets such as 
epistemic orientation (at least in Study 2) and intellectual values might be seen as less 
dispositional constructs as suggested by notions of Kuhn and colleagues (Kuhn, 2009; 
Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn & Park, 2005). As section 1.2 describes, according to Kuhn 
and colleagues, evaluativist epistemological understanding is a belief system developed 
over many years between childhood and adulthood, and intellectual values are consid-
ered to be founded on evaluativist epistemological understanding. However, the present 
results show that the will-facets epistemic orientation (indicating a tendency to move 
away from rather absolutist beliefs toward more evaluativist beliefs) and intellectual 
values might be considered malleable by effective instructional approaches such as the 
training interventions in this dissertation. 
As a side note, there was no reason to assume that the third will-facet of this disser-
tation, epistemic knowledge, has some sort of dispositional character. Epistemic 
knowledge was introduced as declarative knowledge about will-principles (see section 
2.2.2). Generally, declarative knowledge is not of dispositional character; it is ac-
quirable knowledge about facts, concepts, and principles (Anderson, 1993; Renkl, 
2009). For instance, declarative knowledge about skill-principles had already been suc-
cessfully and enduringly fostered by the skill-training intervention in Study 1, suggest-
ing a similar positive effect on epistemic knowledge (i.e., declarative knowledge about 
will-principles) by the will-training intervention in Study 2. 
This dissertation also reveals more insights with respect to the malleability of intel-
lectual values. First, the findings in Study 2 revealed that epistemic orientation assessed 
immediately after the experiment mediated the will-training intervention’s effect on 
intellectual values one week after the training. This mediation implies that intellectual 
values (one week after the training) had been fostered indirectly through the fostering 
of epistemic orientation. As mentioned earlier, this epistemic orientation means a ten-
dency toward beliefs that an individual on the evaluativist level of epistemological un-
derstanding holds (see section 1.2). Conclusively, these results underline the suggestion 
by Kuhn and Park (2005) that intellectual values are based on the evaluativist level of 
epistemological understanding. Second, regarding the development of intellectual   
values, there was a delayed increase of intellectual values after one week. In Study 2, 
the will-training intervention’s positive effect on intellectual values did not appear until 
one week after the intervention. In Study 3, the positive effect on intellectual values did 
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indeed show already immediately after the intervention but still even increased (de-
scriptively) after one week. This suggests that the training interventions may have 
served as an initial impulse to value intellectual engagement. This initial impulse may 
have been supported by intellectual activities at school during the week between the 
intervention and the delayed posttest, hence resulting in a delayed effect on intellectual 
values. This suggestion seems consistent with Kuhn and Park’s (2005) notion that intel-
lectual values are “embedded in cultural meaning systems” (p. 155). In summary, all 
the will-facets proposed within this dissertation appear to be malleable by short-term 
training interventions, highlighting especially the effects on epistemic orientation and 
intellectual values. 
3.2.3 The will as a feasible base for the skill of argumentative thinking 
The main theoretical rational for this dissertation—following Kuhn (2001)—was 
that both the skill and the will are central prerequisites for argumentative thinking (see 
Chapter 1). Thus, it is legitimate to ask, which of these two prerequisites should be 
addressed first? For Kuhn and colleagues (Kuhn, 2005; Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Lao & 
Kuhn, 2002), this question might not be of great relevance, as they would likely pro-
pose long-term indirect instructional measures to foster argumentative processes. As 
mentioned in section 1.4, Kuhn’s (2005) interactive and argumentative discourses fea-
tured tasks such as peer-discussion, recognizing different qualities of reasons, or pre-
paring for a final confrontation. These discourses could be considered as indirectly fos-
tering both the skill and the will of argumentative thinking simultaneously. When it 
comes to more direct and short-instructional measures though, training both the skill-
principles and the will-principles simultaneously might overstrain the learners. When 
developing short-term training interventions that focus on either the skill-principles or 
the will-principles at one time, the inevitable question arises: Should one address the 
will before the skill or vice versa? For considerations about this question, the literature 
offers the following aspects: Kuhn and colleagues would regard evaluativist epistemo-
logical understanding (i.e., the fundamental will-component, see section 1.2) as “a cru-
cial underpinning” (Kuhn, 2010, p. 13), a “supporting structure” (Kuhn, 2001, p. 7), 
and “an essential foundation” (Kuhn & Park, 2005, p. 114) of (the skill of) argumenta-
tive thinking. Does this imply that the will to engage in argumentative thinking should 
be fostered first? There is a sound reason to assume just that: The will to engage in ar-
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gumentative thinking means nothing less than considering argumentative thinking as a 
reasonable and worthwhile tool to gain deep understanding and well-grounded conclu-
sions—particularly when facing conflicting scientific positions (see section 1.2). As a 
result, argumentative thinking has perceivable benefits or utility value (e.g., Eccles & 
Wigfield, 2002), which can motivate leaners to acquire the skill of argumentative think-
ing. Whereas they might not strive to acquire this skill for its own sake, they might 
strive to acquire it because of its utility value that is being a helpful tool for processing 
conflicting scientific positions. 
The findings of Study 3 shed some light on these theoretical considerations because 
Study 3 featured comparisons between the interventions’ effects on argument quality. 
Even though all three training interventions fostered argument quality, the will-skill-
version of the combined-training intervention showed to be superior compared to the 
other training interventions in terms of fostering argument quality. In other words, 
training the will before the skill of argumentative thinking turned out to be this disserta-
tion’s most effective preparation regarding argument quality and thus regarding the 
learners’ actual performance of argumentative thinking. Admittedly, some sort of re-
cency effect (cf. Murdock Jr, 1962) may have had some influence on this finding. It is 
possible that during the argumentation phase, participants who received the will-skill-
version might have remembered the skill-principles better than participants who re-
ceived the skill-will-version might have. This might be due to the fact that the will-
skill-version addressed the skill-principles at the end of the intervention immediately 
before the argumentation phase, whereas the skill-will-version addressed the skill-
principles at the beginning of the intervention (see Table 1 in section 2.1). Thus, at the 
beginning of the argumentation phase, participants who received the will-skill-version 
might have had an advantage of an easier availability of skill-principles in their 
memory. However, the argumentation phase afforded the participants to generate their 
own position on a new topic that featured conflicting scientific positions. This task re-
quired actual argumentative thinking. In contrast, the studies about the recency effect 
typically referred to a simple free recall of items (cf. Howard & Kahana, 1999). Argu-
mentative thinking, however, goes way beyond such a free recall of items, thus curtail-
ing expectations of a recency effect affecting argumentative thinking. In conclusion, 
albeit the need for further empirical evidence, the advantage of the will-skill-version for 
fostering argumentative thinking contributes to the theoretical assumption that the will 
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to engage in argumentative thinking might be considered to be a feasible base for the 
skill of argumentative thinking. 
3.3 Practical Implications 
The training interventions in this dissertation fostered skill-facets and will-facets. 
Furthermore, they fostered argument quality referring to the output that comes from 
performing argumentative thinking. The training interventions also fostered self-
explanation quality that referred to the central skill- and will-principles. From a more 
practical point of view, the goal of this dissertation was to provide instructional impli-
cations for training skill and will of argumentative thinking. The following three in-
structional suggestions can be derived from this research against the background of the 
results of all three studies. They could serve as practical implications to guide the de-
sign of short-term training interventions to foster skill and will of argumentative think-
ing. 
3.3.1 Foster self-explanation quality that refers to central skill- and will-principles 
As section 3.2.1 emphasized, it is important to ensure a high self-explanation quali-
ty that refers to the central skill- and will-principles, because it was a crucial factor for 
learning processes during the training interventions. It mediated important effects that 
go beyond immediate performances (i.e., effects on declarative knowledge and         
epistemic knowledge after one week) and beyond effects on knowledge (i.e., effects on 
argument quality). How could this fostering of self-explanation quality be achieved 
concretely? A combination of learning goals, a theoretical introduction, and corres-
ponding self-explanation prompts (all three referring to the targeted central principles) 
appears to be an effective way to foster self-explanation quality that refers to the central 
principles. This notion is not only in line with the guidelines in recent literature (e.g., 
Renkl, 2011, 2014), but also cross-experimentally (and thus strongly) supported by the 
three studies in this dissertation. After all, both the control groups and the training 
groups received identical video examples, thus ruling these out as a difference maker. 
However, only the training groups received the learning goals, the theoretical introduc-
tion, and the self-explanation prompts that exclusively referred to the central skill-/will-
principles. By contrast, the control groups’ learning goals, theoretical introduction, and 
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self-explanation prompts referred to e-learning and ecological content and neglected 
any principles of the skill and/or the will of argumentative thinking. 
3.3.2 Foster both skill and will of argumentative thinking 
When the goal is to foster argumentative thinking, learners should receive a training 
intervention on both the skill and the will of argumentative thinking. More specifically, 
such a training intervention should address the will before the skill. This implication is 
based on the following cross-experimental step-by-step considerations about the find-
ings of all three studies and refers to the actual performance of argumentative thinking: 
First of all, the skill-training intervention fostered argument quality (see Study 1), 
which served as an indicator of argumentative thinking (see section 2.2.3). However, 
the skill-training intervention did not focus on the will to engage in argumentative 
thinking, because its goal was to exclusively foster the skill of argumentative thinking. 
Hence, the skill-training intervention addressed only one (i.e., the skill) of two (i.e., the 
skill and the will) prerequisites of argumentative thinking. Thus, with respect to argu-
mentative thinking, there should be room for improvement, especially when learners 
with little will to engage in argumentative thinking are involved. In other words, when 
the goal is actually to foster argumentative thinking (and not exclusively the skill to do 
so) the skill-training intervention should not be the practical method of choice. The 
same applies for the will-training intervention. It exclusively focused on fostering the 
will to engage in argumentative thinking irrespective of the participants’ skill to do so. 
It was successful in fostering the application of evaluativist knowledge (Study 2), 
which can be seen as a precursor of argumentative thinking (see section 2.2.3). How-
ever, this will-training intervention is not recommended when the goal is to foster ar-
gumentative thinking because it did not address the necessary skill of argumentative 
thinking. The question arises what is the method of choice for fostering argumentative 
thinking? Against the background of all three studies in this dissertation, it is the com-
bined-training intervention, particularly the will-skill-version. Study 3 identified the 
will-skill-version of the combined-training intervention—which addressed the skill 
after the will—as being superior at fostering argument quality when compared to the 
other training interventions. In a nutshell, to train argumentative thinking, it is recom-
mended to foster both the skill and the will of argumentative thinking; in terms of or-
der, the will before the skill for best results. As a practical implication, use the will-
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skill-version of the combined-training intervention if learners should engage in argu-
mentative thinking and generate their own position on conflicting scientific positions. 
3.3.3 Enhance the skill-training intervention for an enduring effect on procedural 
knowledge 
When the goal is to foster learners’ procedural knowledge about argumentation, the 
skill-training intervention should receive some enhancements. As section 3.1.1 pre-
sents, the skill-training intervention reached its limits: Although it did indeed foster 
procedural knowledge immediately after the training intervention (Study 1 and Study 
3), this effect was not strong enough and thus failed to show one week later in both 
studies. Furthermore, the combined-training intervention did not foster procedural 
knowledge at all (see section 2.5). This particular result was no surprise, given the 
modest nature of the combined-training intervention, which featured only one video 
example on skill. As the skill-training intervention featured two video examples on 
skill, it follows that one video example might not be enough to foster procedural 
knowledge. Therefore, from a practical point of view, an immediate effect on proce-
dural knowledge requires a skill-training intervention that features at least two video 
examples on skill. However, as the results of Study 1 and Study 3 show, for an endur-
ing effect on procedural knowledge, a short-term skill-training intervention—even with 
two video examples—is insufficient. As mentioned earlier with respect to the ACT-R 
theory and different knowledge types (Anderson, 1983, 1993), it might take more time 
and effort to acquire procedural knowledge than declarative knowledge. This is due to 
the fact that procedural knowledge needs to be compiled from declarative knowledge 
(Anderson, 1993). Now from a more practical point of view, the question arises, what 
modification of the skill-training intervention might foster procedural knowledge for 
more enduring effects? 
Future studies should test a training intervention with an increased number of video 
examples on the skill of argumentative thinking. Study 3 showed, that one video exam-
ple on skill (in the combined-training intervention) was not sufficient to produce an 
effect on procedural knowledge. Furthermore, Study 1 and Study 3 showed that two 
video examples on skill were indeed sufficient for an immediate, but in fact insufficient 
for an enduring effect. Even more video examples might induce an enduring effect on 
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procedural knowledge. Moreover, given the fact that procedural knowledge is defined 
as knowledge that is manifested in people’s performance (Anderson, 1993), the argu-
mentation phase might play a crucial role in fostering procedural knowledge. This is 
due to the fact that procedural knowledge refers to knowledge about generating argu-
mentative elements and the argumentation phase in fact afforded generating argumenta-
tive elements for one’s own position. In other words, this phase afforded practicing just 
the performance that the procedural knowledge variable refers to. Thus, a further modi-
fication of the skill-training intervention to improve its effectiveness on procedural 
knowledge might involve implementing two or more self-regulated argumentation 
phases. This would afford learners more occasions to practice generating their own 
position on conflicting scientific positions of new topics, which is likely to induce an 
enduring effect on procedural knowledge. 
3.4 Limitations and Guidelines for Future Research 
How far can the findings of this research be generalized? Despite the promising re-
sults of the three studies in this dissertation, some limitations and open questions need 
to be addressed. 
3.4.1 The domain of ecology 
The decision to use the domain of ecology for the training interventions in this dis-
sertation reflects the major importance that biology education places on scientific ar-
gumentation and evaluation in this domain (see section 1.3). Furthermore, the training 
interventions featured three different topics in this domain (i.e., biodiversity, global 
warming, and genetic engineering). Each of these topics provided genuine conflicting 
scientific positions that can be supported with evidence. However, with respect to the 
domain, the generalizability of the findings is restricted. Although the self-regulated 
argumentation phase afforded a type of transfer in that the participants had to generate 
their own position on a new topic that was not addressed in the video examples (i.e., 
genetic engineering), the topic was still related to the domain of ecology. Thus, future 
studies should analyze training interventions that feature conflicting scientific positions 
in other domains to assure that the present findings are generally applicable.  
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3.4.2 Testing the training interventions as whole packages 
Another aspect that could be regarded as a limitation of (possible expectations in) 
this research is the focus on the training interventions as a whole. In fact, the clear goal 
of this research was to develop and test short-term training interventions as effective 
interventions as a whole. This goal was reached and three experimental studies demon-
strated the effectiveness of this dissertation’s three training interventions. However, a 
detailed analysis of which of the training interventions’ components (i.e., learning 
goals, theoretical introduction, video examples, self-explanation prompts, and self-
regulated argumentation phase) caused which effect, was not one of the goals of this 
research. Rather, each training intervention was developed as a package of components 
and tested as a whole—a frequently used approach in previous research on training 
interventions (e.g., Berthold & Renkl, 2010; Busch et al., 2008; McNamara, 2004). 
Nevertheless, referring to effects of the present training interventions’ components, the 
following aspects can be offered: 
Mediation analyses revealed that self-explanation quality that referred to the central 
skill- and will-principles had a major positive influence on the training interventions’ 
effects on knowledge about these principles after one week and on argument quality 
(see also section 3.2.1). In addition to the mediation analyses, theoretical and logical 
considerations can provide further conclusions about the components’ effects. For in-
stance, section 3.3.1 suggests a combination of learning goals, theoretical introduction, 
and self-explanation prompts (all referring to central principles) as an effective way to 
foster self-explanation quality that refers to these principles. Moreover, the skill-
training intervention’s argumentation phase might play a crucial role in fostering pro-
cedural knowledge, as section 3.3.3 explains. 
However, it cannot precisely be stated which component and the extent to which it 
was responsible for the effects—for instance on procedural knowledge. Nevertheless, 
as analyzing the effects of different instructional components was not the goal of this 
research, it should be addressed in future studies. 
3.4.3 The framework for the skill of argumentative thinking 
Another point worth discussing, which also offers guidelines for future research, re-
fers to the framework for addressing the skill of argumentative thinking in the training 
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interventions. This framework was based on a modification of Kuhn’s (1991, 2005) 
argumentation model and featured six argumentative elements and their functions (see 
section 1.1). Admittedly, the interventions’ presentation of these elements and their 
functions in the theoretical introduction as well as in the video examples might be con-
sidered as being rather basic or even simplistic. The learning material referred to basal 
characteristics that high school students should be able to grasp in about an hour. For 
instance, the interventions portrayed genuine evidence as contributing to the clarifica-
tion of the theory’s truth. More importantly, they presented empirical findings as genu-
ine evidence and contrasted this to pseudoevidence such as explanations or further de-
scriptions of the initial theory. However, none of the interventions addressed aspects 
such as the quality and significance of genuine evidence, the difference between causal-
ity and correlation, or generalization issues. Furthermore, when it came to the argumen-
tative elements rebuttal and synthesis, the difference between sufficiency and necessity, 
or typical fallacies were not part of any intervention. Thus, these features might be add-
ed to future training interventions to provide a more in-depth and more challenging 
view on argumentative elements and their functions. Of course, learning time and the 
learners’ background should be adequately considered and the effects of such extended 
training interventions should be experimentally investigated. 
3.4.4 The framework for the will of argumentative thinking 
Another possible limitation of this research refers to the framework for the will of 
argumentative thinking. As discussed in section 1.2, the will-components of the train-
ing interventions as well as the instruments to measure will-facets were developed on 
the basis of Kuhn and colleagues’ developmental approach of epistemological under-
standing (Kuhn, 2005; Kuhn et al., 2000; Kuhn & Park, 2005). The following aspect 
should be taken into consideration: This developmental approach of epistemological 
understanding by Kuhn and colleagues is not the only approach to study and analyze 
personal epistemology (Barzilai & Zohar, 2014); there are various and even partly con-
tradicting scientific approaches in current research, such as the resource approach as 
outlined by Louca et al. (2004) or dimensional models (e.g., Ferguson & Braten, 2013; 
Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). This dissertation’s exclusive focus on one particular approach 
(i.e., the developmental approach by Kuhn and colleagues) might also be considered as 
strength with respect to theoretical and practical clarity and consistency. Nevertheless, 
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the training interventions in this dissertation might not be the preferred instructional 
methods for theoretical perspectives that, for instance, seek to activate developed    
epistemological resources in the sense of Louca et al. (2004). This is because the train-
ing interventions did not focus on activating epistemological resources, but rather on a 
first impulse to help learners reach the evaluativist level of epistemological understand-
ing. If activating developed epistemological resources in the sense of the resource ap-
proach (e.g., Louca et al., 2004) is the instructional goal of choice, it will be recom-
mendable to develop and analyze appropriate interventions in future studies. 
3.4.5 The training interventions’ short-term character 
As a final limitation, the short-term character of the training interventions’ might be 
taken into consideration. Indeed, the goal of this research was to develop and analyze 
short-term training interventions to foster skill and will of argumentative thinking. 
Therefore, the short amount of learning time (about an hour) of these interventions 
should be emphasized. Nonetheless, the short-term training interventions proved to be a 
promising first step, an initial impulse. The next step would be building on the promis-
ing results of this research and developing longer and more in-depth interventions. For 
instance, the number of video examples and self-regulated argumentation phases in the 
interventions could be increased. Furthermore, as suggested in section 3.4.3, the 
framework for the skill of argumentative thinking could be enhanced. Finally, it seems 
feasible to suggest bringing these further developed interventions into the classroom 
with some sort of blended learning for a number of lessons—for example in biology 
lessons in order to reflect core competences of biology education, namely scientific 
argumentation and evaluation (Baxmann et al., 2009). Combining further developed 
training interventions to foster skill and will of argumentative thinking with class activ-
ities and exercises might be a fruitful support for reaching central goals of education: to 
qualify leaners to successfully engage in scientific argumentation, and to enable them 
to contribute to society in their growing role as responsible citizens when leaving 
school (Kuhn, 2005). 
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3.5 Conclusion 
Very briefly, this dissertation revealed three important and concise implications for 
instruction and research on training skill and will of argumentative thinking: 
(a) Use short-term training interventions for first promising effects on skill and will 
of argumentative thinking. Featuring a learning time of only about an hour, these short-
term training interventions proved to be capable of fostering skill-facets, will-facets, 
and argument quality (i.e., argumentative thinking). These findings underline the high 
potential of short-term training interventions when starting to foster skill and will of 
argumentative thinking. Building on this fertile ground, further (long-term) interven-
tions and/or blended-learning approaches to further facilitate argumentative thinking 
might follow. 
(b) Ensure self-explanation quality that refers to the training interventions’ central 
principles. Self-explanation quality that refers to central skill- and will-principles was 
identified as a mediator for enduring effects on declarative knowledge about both the 
central skill- and the will-principles. It also mediated the effect on argumentative think-
ing (i.e., argument quality). Thus, self-explaining the video examples’ underlying skill- 
and will-principles is a crucial learning process during the training interventions and its 
fostering is of great importance. To ensure this, a corresponding combination of learn-
ing goals, theoretical introduction, and self-explanation prompts (that all refer to the 
central principles) is an essential part of effective training interventions. 
(c) Train the will and then the skill of argumentative thinking. Building on Kuhn 
(2001), this dissertation’s main rationale was that argumentative thinking requires both 
the skill and the will to do so. Hence, considering argumentative thinking a reasonable 
and worthwhile endeavor (i.e., having the will) is not sufficient to successfully engage 
in argumentative thinking without having any skill to perform it. However, as Study 3 
revealed, considering argumentative thinking to be reasonable and worthwhile might 
serve as fruitful base and facilitate the acquisition of the skill to perform it. 
The author hopes that this research will contribute to a better understanding of fos-
tering skill and will of argumentative thinking and the potential of short-term training 
interventions. Furthermore, he is hopeful that this research will stimulate further inves-
tigation and development of approaches to foster argumentative thinking as well as of 
applications of training interventions. 
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